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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
Laura Guttuso was an exceptional scholar. Her ambition1 was to make more sense 
of competition law by openly recognising it as a field in which public and private law 
— public and private mechanisms of enforcement, in particular — collide. Her vision 
for the future entailed approaching the respective enforcement processes more 
‘holistically’; easing the most palpable tensions between them at their various points of 
contact. It also involved supplementing the predominant utilitarian, law-and-economics 
paradigms of competition law2 with more deontological modes of thinking, so as to 
achieve a better blend of deterrence policy on the one hand, and fairness, due process 
and meaningful protection for the victims of anti-competitive practice, on the other. She 
believed, as an increasing number of scholars now do, that competition law exists to 
protect the rights of individual competitors, not just competition itself, and that the law 
should therefore be guided not just by classical and behavioural economics, but also by 
Aristotelian norms of corrective and distributive justice, modern ‘rights’ thinking, 
responsive regulation and procedural justice.3 Intellectually and at heart, Laura was 
therefore a pluralist. This came across not just in her attitudes toward other people — 
which were invariably generous and inclusive — but also in her thinking about 
competition law itself.  
Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is 
sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, 
cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a 
keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the 
turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law 
have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being 
an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with 
scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in 
which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the 
project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile 
complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, 
or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems. This 
poses a persistent and daunting meta-question about how the law can viably 
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accommodate diversity and complexity without sacrificing its key claims to coherence.4 
It requires a sophisticated theory of co-ordination between multiple lawmakers and 
enforcement agents that avoids contradiction between rules and actors in the system. 
That is something akin to a search for the Holy Grail.5  
It may not be possible to meet all of these challenges. My aim here is to make a 
modest contribution to Laura’s project by connecting the important work she did on 
public and private enforcement in competition law to debates in public and private law 
more generally. In particular, I wish to explore the extent to which the hybrid (dual) 
enforcement system found in competition law recurs elsewhere in public and private 
law; and to unpack the principles governing choices between the two enforcement 
methods. My purpose is to determine whether enforcement hybridity is a random 
phenomenon — simply the product of historical constraints and opportunities — or a 
more concerted, rational practice that has a legitimate place in the modern law. I shall 
reach the latter view.   
Part II sets out some prefatory definitions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ to frame the 
following analysis. It will be seen that, according to these definitions, many competition 
wrongs are ‘hybrid’ phenomena in more than one sense. They are private as well as 
public law wrongs (breaches of duties owed to individuals, as well as to the state); they 
violate private, as well as public rights and interests; and they give rise to private, as well 
as public rights of action. In this respect, they are akin to wrongs such as trespass to the 
person, misfeasance in public office, public nuisance and statutory wrongs targeting 
unfair and misleading business practices,6 which give rise to both public sanctions and 
private remedies. Part III then reviews the way in which enforcement is modelled in 
public and private law more generally. It demonstrates that, far from being unique to 
competition law, enforcement hybridity features regularly across both public and private 
law. Part IV then identifies a number of common principles informing choices between 
public and private enforcement systems. Here, I shall suggest that whilst some of the 
most commonly-cited reasons for choosing one form of enforcement over another are 
pragmatic, there is also a coherent line of moral reasoning that helps to explain 




II   PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: DEFINITION AND HYBRIDITY 
 
We must begin with some definitions, because ‘the’ public/private distinction is 
multifaceted, like a gem.7 In the following discussion, references to the distinction are 
actually references to three, different distinctions — between public and private law, 
between public and private interests and between public and private enforcement.  
 
A   Public and Private Law 
 
For current purposes, I take public law to be the law that governs legal relationships 
between persons and the state (acting qua state), as opposed the relationship between 																																								 																					
4  On the meaning(s) of coherence and arguments supporting it, see A Fell, ‘The Concept of 
Coherence in Australian Private Law’ (2018) 41 MULR 1160. 
5  On the challenges of ‘complexity’, see K Barker, ‘Private Law as a Complex System’ in K Barker, 
K Fairweather and R Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart, 2017) 3, 18–24. 
6  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2, Ch 4.   
7  K Barker, ‘Private Law, Key Encounters with Public Law’, in K Barker, D Jensen (eds), Private 
Law, Key Encounters with Public Law (CUP, 2013) 19–25.  
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one person and another (private law). Some wrongful acts, such as battery, 
unconscionable dealing, misfeasance in public office and public nuisance are ‘hybrid 
wrongs’ in the sense that they are simultaneously both wrongs against the state and 
against private parties. This is true, I suggest below, of many anti-competitive acts. Not 
only do such acts sometimes amount to the private law torts of intimidation, conspiracy, 
or unlawful interference with trade,8 but many competition law statutes give rise to rights 
and duties between offenders and individual victims, as well as to rights and duties 





B   Public and Private Interests 
    
 Public law typically protects public interests, which I define as the interests we 
share in consequence of our membership of a political community. Private law, by 
contrast, is paradigmatically concerned with the protection of personal interests — those 
we have as individuals, independently of the political community to which we belong. 
The two sets of interests regularly coalesce in the same person or persons, but remain 
conceptually distinct. I hence have a private interest in not being hit by you, or in you 
keeping your contracts with me, but I also have a broader public interest, in common 
with all other members of society, in living in a community in which assaults do not take 
place and in which commercial transactions are reasonably reliable.  
Although private law mainly protects private interests, it sometimes takes public 
interest arguments into account in determining the scope and content of the rights and 
remedies it provides. Exemplary damages for torts and accounts (or constructive trusts) 
of profits for breaches of fiduciary duty are examples of private law remedies that have 
a public, prophylactic purpose. There is also a wide range of defences to private law 
claims protecting public interests, such as the defence of illegality; the public interest 
defence to actions for breach of confidence; and privilege defences in defamation law. 
Likewise, although public law exists primarily to protect public interests, it sometimes 
also remedies the harm that public wrongs cause to private interests. Criminal 
compensation orders for personal injury or private property damage provide the best-
known example. Awards of damages for violations of the state’s obligations under the 																																								 																					
8  See generally K Barker, P Cane, M Lunney, F Trindade, The Law of Torts in Australia (OUP, 5th 
ed., 2012) 268–90.  
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Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) provide another. The right to life which the state has a 
public duty to protect under the Act is hence not just protective of my public interest as 
a British citizen in living in a society in which killing is prohibited, but also my personal 
interest in not being killed. Each of these examples illustrates a second type of hybridity 
existing in both public and private law that I shall call ‘interest hybridity’.  
 
C   Public and Private Enforcement 
 
Public enforcement is any process of enforcement controlled by a state agency (or 
agency exercising state functions) as opposed to a private individual, or group of 
individuals (‘private enforcement’). The primary enforcement mechanism in criminal 
law is hence public, because state prosecuting authorities, not victims, have the ability 
to initiate or terminate a prosecution. Victims may have an input, in initiating a complaint 
or assisting with inquires or evidence, but they generally have no legal power over the 
process. By contrast, enforcement is private when it is an individual, or a group 
representing the interests of its individual members, that holds the right (power) of legal 
action and settlement. As section III below demonstrates, both public and private law 
evince hybridity in this, third sense as well (‘enforcement hybridity’) because both fields 
of law provide examples of both the public and private enforcement of rights and duties.  
 
D   Competition Law Hybridity 
 
On the above definitions, the wrongs of competition law are public/private hybrids 
in all three dimensions of hybridity. Anti-competitive acts are both public and private 
law wrongs because they describe the breach of duties owed by wrongdoers both to the 
state (qua state) and to private individuals. Competition wrongs also involve clear 
interest hybridity, because they protect both the public interest in the creation of a fair, 
competitive market and the private economic interests of individual competitors within 
that market. And, as Laura’s work illustrates, they provide one of the clearest examples 
of enforcement hybridity too, because, depending on the jurisdiction one is in, 
individuals, groups (in representative and class actions), regulatory agencies and state 
prosecutorial authorities all have intricately-configured and carefully-conditioned rights 
of action that intersect in complex ways. The very wide range of different remedies 
available in competition law,9 reflect its interest hybridity — the different public and 
private purposes that it serves simultaneously.  
 The fact that competition law protects the private economic interests of 
competitors, not just the public interest in competition ‘as a whole’, is affirmed by two 
facts. First, the common law torts of intimidation, conspiracy and wrongful interference 
with trade have long recognised that individuals have qualified private rights to trade 
free from the unfair interference of others. This makes it likely, I think, that modern 
competition legislation exists for the sake of individual traders, not just for the sake of 
the market. Secondly, even if the connection between statutory competition wrongs and 
their common law analogues is questionable, the fact that the statutory regimes now 
provide compensation for individuals harmed by anti-competitive practice surely places 
the matter beyond doubt. The compensatory remedies for individual litigants in private 
follow-on actions are not just deterrent incentives, but correlate logically to underlying 
primary rights that those individuals enjoy against wrongdoers. They must do so, 
because there can be no compensatory remedy for an individual in the absence of an 																																								 																					
9  These include criminal sanctions (e.g. imprisonment, or multiple liability for the gains or losses 
resulting from an infringement), injunctions, disgorgement damages, adverse publicity orders, 
divestment orders and compensation orders.   
Vol 37(1) Modelling Public and Private Enforcement 13 
	
underlying primary right: ubi remedium, ibi ius. Their existence bolsters Laura’s claim 
that one of the aims of competition law is to do corrective justice. 10     
The idea that the aims of competition law are hybrid and include doing corrective 
justice in the Aristotelian sense is not new,11 but surprisingly uncommon. This is no 
doubt a consequence of the overbearing influence of the law-and-economics paradigm 
in the United States. Once one accepts, however, that there are such things as private 
rights to the qualified protection of pure economic interests, the conclusion that 
violations of those rights through anti-competitive practices ought to resound in 
remedies for private parties as a matter of corrective justice follows straightforwardly.  
Distinct and marginally more difficult, perhaps, is the question whether the 
compensatory remedies that are now increasingly available to victims through class 
actions in competition law are doing corrective, or distributive justice. The nature of 
competition wrongs is such that it is often hard to prove the precise effect of a given 
breach upon any given individual’s economic position and proof of such an impact is 
normally regarded as an essential component of the framework of inter-personal 
responsibility that corrective justice instantiates. Thus, it might be argued, class action 
awards in follow-on proceedings are more likely to be engaged in a form of localised 
distributive justice12 — akin to providing a statutory compensation pool for groups of 
victims, funded by (a) cartelist(s) — than corrective justice in its true person-to-person 
form. The same difficulty attends the analysis of class actions for ‘mass torts’ and its 
resolution depends on whether one thinks that relaxing traditional causation rules in 
private claims in order to ameliorate insuperable burdens of proof actually involves 
departing from a corrective justice approach. I take no position on this question for now. 
From Laura’s point of view, I do not think it mattered whether competition law in these 
instances is doing corrective, or localised distributive justice.13 Her key point was that 
private enforcement actions do not exist solely to provide the correct economic 
incentives to wrongdoers. Competition law wrongs are harms to private, as well as public 
interests. One consequence of this is that wrongdoers owe moral responsibilities to those 
they have wronged to set right the wrong. Another, I suggest below, is that competition 
law’s enforcement hybridity is justified from a deontological, not simply an 
instrumentalist point of view. It is a matter of moral importance, not just efficiency, that 
individual victims have their own rights of action, just as it is politically important that 
state agencies have powers to protect markets for the common good. 
 
 
III   MODELS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
 
How, then, is enforcement currently modelled in public and private law? The 
position is more complex than one might expect. Whilst private law predominantly gives 
rise to private enforcement and public law to public enforcement, enforcement hybridity 																																								 																					
10  Guttuso, ‘Faces of Janus’, above n 1, 290–94. The possibility that compensatory remedies are 
designed to deter public wrongs (not protect private rights) is acknowledged, but counter-intuitive 
— why limit deterrence by the compensatory measure? Why pay the money to plaintiffs, not the 
state?  
11  E Robertson, ‘A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation’ (2000) 49 Catholic University 
Law Review 741. 
12  See S Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449. 
13  She perhaps favoured the former view, on the basis that ‘… class actions can be regarded … as 
procedural aggregations of individual right-duty relations, meaning the important individual “link” 
between particular plaintiff and particular defendant [that is required for corrective justice] is not 
severed’: Draft Thesis, Ch 2, p 12.  
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exists in both domains. Both public and private law can be enforced both publicly and 
privately.   
 
A   Model 1 — Public Law, Public Enforcement 
 
Public law is usually enforced publicly. This is the case in the criminal law and in 
competition law in Europe and Australia, where most actions have historically been 
brought by regulatory agencies, or prosecuting authorities.14 It is also true in cases of 
public nuisance, where public health hazards or interferences with public rights of way 
are restrained at the initiative of the Attorney-General.15   
The remedies available in such public proceedings are presumptively designed to 
protect the public interests underlying the relevant, public law — they disapprove and 
deter crime and anti-competitive conduct through punishment or civil penalty, or (in the 
case of public nuisance) prevent public health hazards or inconveniences through 
injunctive command. In the criminal law, however, public enforcement can also give 
rise to compensatory relief at the sentencing stage, where a victim’s protected private 
interests have been affected. Where the sanctions attaching to public law wrongs entail 
the stigma of criminalisation, or other harsh personal consequences for offenders, the 
onus of proof and procedural hurdles facing public enforcers are elevated, but if these 
are overcome, then allowing courts to grant compensation in the same public proceeding 
is regarded as procedurally unproblematic. Indeed, forcing the victim of a violent crime 
to sue separately for battery in a civil court in order to obtain her medical costs is rightly 
considered unduly formalistic, duplicative and wasteful. This approach, interestingly, 
does not follow through into competition law, or the law of public nuisance, where 
compensation orders are currently only available to victims in subsequent, private 
proceedings.16 Given the criminal law example, there is a decent case for reconsidering 
whether or not compensation orders should be made available in public enforcement 
proceedings more generally, so as to avoid the need for duplicative private actions.17 A 
possible objection in competition and public nuisance law is that large numbers of 
victims are usually implicated, so that it would be costly and difficult for state agencies 
to gather the required information about relevant losses. That does not, however, rule 
out the possibility of public compensation orders in cases involving only a handful of 







14  The European position is changing: Directive 2014/104/EU [2014] OJ L349/1; D Geradin, 
‘Collective Redress for Antitrust Damages in the European Union: Is this a Reality Now?’ (2015) 
22 George Mason University Law Review 1079.  
15  The action may be either at the AG’s own initiative (ex officio) or at the request of affected parties 
(ex relatione).  
16  This was not always so in public nuisance: when Crown rights were infringed, infringers could be 
ordered to repair the King’s property: V Schwartz, P Goldberg ‘The Law of Public Nuisance: 
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort’ (2006) 45 Washburn Law Journal 541, 543.  
17  A Ezrachi and M Ioannidou, ‘Public Compensation as a Complementary Mechanism to Damages 
Actions: From Policy Justifications to Formal Implementation’ (2012) 3 Journal of European 
Competition Law and Practice 536. 
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B   Model 2 — Public Law, Private Enforcement18 
 
Competition law in the United States provides a classic example of the private 
enforcement of public law.19 The phenomenon has distinctive, historical explanations 
there, residing in the general public distrust — and the consequent political weakness — 
of state and federal agencies. Americans seem to have an uneasy relationship with the 
idea of regulating economic markets at the best of times and they are certainly not sold 
on the idea that regulatory power should always reside in public hands, often preferring 
instead to use private litigation as a form of ex post facto control. This preference extends 
well beyond competition law and often resounds in the use of tort law for quasi-
regulatory purposes.20 Laura was a tentative enthusiast for expanding the role of private 
enforcement in Australian competition law and advocated the wider use of class actions 
(and cy-près remedies) to increase its effectiveness. Given the ACCC’s poor record to 
date in curtailing anticompetitive practice, one can understand why.    
  Other examples of private enforcement in public law include private criminal 
prosecutions21 and the Qui Tam action, which has ancient English roots, but which now 
features in the US regime for the detection and deterrence of fraud upon government, 
where it offers private parties substantial rewards for their involvement.22 Since 1535, 
private parties have also had powers to sue for damages for public nuisance, where they 
can prove ‘special’ damage.23 In human rights law, UK citizens can sue in ordinary 
courts for breach of the state’s duties under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and obtain 
compensation by way of just satisfaction.24  In administrative law, private individuals 
are the main enforcers of government’s public duties of legality, rationality and 
procedural propriety in applications for judicial review.25    
In the last of these contexts, the private enforcers of public duties are typically those 
whose private interests have been affected by the breach, but in some jurisdictions the 
enforcer pool has been enlarged to include private groups with credible claims to 
represent broader public interests.26 It has sometimes been suggested that anyone should 
have the power to challenge improper administrative decisions, so that standing rules 
																																								 																					
18  W Landes, R Posner, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’ (1975) 4 The Journal of Legal Studies 1; 
J M Glover, ‘The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law’ (2012) 53 
William and Mary Law Review 1137. 
19  See D Baker, ‘Private and Public Enforcement: Complements, Substitutes and Conflicts’, in A 
Ezrachi (ed), Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) 238; J 
Davis, R Lande, ‘Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antritrust 
Enforcement’ (2013) 36 Seattle University Law Review 1269. 
20  For intriguing recent attempts in the US to use the tort of public nuisance to achieve better gun 
control, see Schwartz and Goldberg, above n 16, 555–57. On the use of tort to control 
administrative power, see P Cane, Controlling Administrative Power (CUP, 2016), esp. 368–98.  
21  These are reportedly on the increase in the UK owing to the under-funding of prosecution 
agencies: ‘Two-Tier Justice: Private Prosecution Revolution’ The Independent, 16th August, 2014. 
22  False Claims Act 31 USC, Sec 3729ff. Rewards typically range from 15–30% of any recovery.  
23  W McRae Jr, ‘The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law’ (1948) 1 University of 
Florida Law Review 27, 36. The right does not include the right to seek injunction or abatement.  
24  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) ss 7, 8. To have standing, the plaintiff must be a ‘victim’ in the 
sense that his or her rights have been (or stand to be) affected, but there is contention around this 
standard stemming from disagreement as to whether plaintiffs are representing private or public 
interests: J Miles, ‘Standing Under the Human Rights Act 1998: Theories of Rights Enforcement 
and the Nature of Public Law Adjudication’ (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 133.   
25  On the use of private actions to enforce administrative responsibilities in the US, see R Stewart 
and C Sunstein, ‘Public Programmes and Private Rights’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 1193. 
26  M Groves (ed.), Modern Administrative Law in Australia (CUP, 2014), Ch 7.   
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should effectively be abandoned, 27  but that suggestion has never been endorsed, 
probably for fear of the vexatious litigation it might spawn. In the United States, it has 
similarly been proposed that individuals should be able to apply for injunctive relief to 
restrain public nuisances where they are representing the general public, or a particular, 
affected class.28 In Qui Tam actions, anyone with knowledge of a fraud upon government 
can initiate proceedings.   
In contrast to competition law, criminal law, actions under the Human Rights Act 
and the law of public nuisance, private enforcers in administrative law cannot obtain 
compensation, despite their standing normally being premised on the fact that their 
private interests have been harmed by the decision they are challenging. If they want 
compensation, rather than just a new decision, they must bring separate civil proceedings 
for the tort for misfeasance in public office, or negligence. The explanation for the 
contrast is unclear. There is no logical obstacle to compensation awards in such cases, 
because some public law systems, such as that in France, do provide compensation to 
individuals harmed by illegal public decisions, sometimes even on a strict liability 
basis.29 This has led at least one leading commentator to suggest that the common law’s 
refusal to grant damages to individuals in public law is altogether too dogmatic.30    
Whether there is a consistent explanation for the use of private enforcement in these 
cases is uncertain. The justifications in criminal law, competition law, public nuisance 
law and in Qui Tam actions seem to lie either in the absence of proper (or willing) public 
agencies to ‘do the enforcement job’, or in the perception that private individuals have 
better access to information about the relevant forms of wrongdoing. The information 
argument often features in the competition literature, but cannot fully justify private 
enforcement, since one could presumably incentivise private parties to provide 
information to public agencies through a reward system, without actually handing them 
the power of suit and (some of) its proceeds. Bounty hunters are not the only solution to 
the law’s detection and information problems — rewarding whistle-blowers and private 
detectives for informing the sheriff seems a less risky option. 31  In the case of 
administrative and human rights law, a distinct justification for private rights of action 
may lie in the desire to preserve the independence of the enforcement process and to 
avoid actual, or perceived, institutional capture. It may be thought that state agencies 
should not generally be in charge of prosecuting excesses of state power, for example, 
because turkeys do not vote for Christmas. In such cases, private enforcement can avoid 
actual or perceived tampering with the system and provide direct lines of accountability 
for citizens.  
A final potential explanation for private enforcement in these public law instances 
is less instrumental and flows from ‘civil recourse’ theory.32 According to this theory, 																																								 																					
27 ALRC Report No 78, Beyond the Doorkeeper (1996), [5.25] (the only restrictions being that 
standing does not contradict statutory intention or unreasonably interfere with another person’s 
private rights). 
28  Schwartz and Goldberg, above n 16, 548.  
29  See D Fairgrieve, F Lichere, ‘The Liability of Public Authorities in France’ in K Oliphant (ed.), 
The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (Intersentia, 2016) 155. The fact 
that this occurs in public law in civilian systems owes much to history.   
30  P Cane, ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) 9 Otago Law Review 489, 516. 
31  Private actions may incentivise private greed and fuel ‘compensation culture’.   
32  B Zipursky, ‘Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts’ (1998) Vanderbilt Law Review 1, 
esp. 82–93; ‘Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 695; 
‘Philosophy of Private Law’ in J Coleman, K Himma, S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP, 2004) 623; ‘Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, 
and Corrective Justice’ (2011) 39 Florida State University Law Review 299; J Goldberg and B 
Zipursky, ‘Unrealized Torts’ (2002) 88 Virginia Law Review 1625; ‘Torts as Wrongs’ (2010) 88 
Vol 37(1) Modelling Public and Private Enforcement 17 
	
one who is wrongly harmed by another has, in a pre-civil society, a right (liberty) to seek 
vengeance upon his offender, or at least to bring him to reckoning so as to obtain some 
redress. As part of a bargain with the emerging state, he or she gives up this liberty in 
exchange for a state-backed power to obtain recourse from the wrongdoer via the legal 
process. Indeed, the state has a public duty to the victim to provide this private legal 
power. On this view, the rights of action that private victims have when they are wronged 
have nothing to do with them being efficient law-enforcers, but stem from moral rights 
(liberties) that those victims have to redress from their offenders. 
 This theory is usually used, like corrective justice theory, to explain the rights of 
action that individual victims have in private law when one person wrongly interferes 
with another’s interests, not to explain private rights of action in public law proceedings. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting because it could explain, in a non-instrumental way, why it 
is that private powers to enforce public law are often linked to instances in which a 
plaintiff’s protected private interests have been harmed. Like corrective justice, it offers 
a glimpse of a more general moral justification for allowing private parties to get 
involved in public law actions — one which regards their powers as not simply 
convenient, pragmatic or effective, but morally legitimate and legitimising at a personal 
level, whenever public law wrongs have simultaneously interfered with private rights.     
 
C   Model 3 — Private Law, Private Enforcement 
 
Private enforcement is the norm in private law. Private parties hence have rights of 
action in all standard disputes concerning contracts, torts, breaches of fiduciary duty, 
property disputes, unjust enrichments, wills, trusts and estates. Where parties do not 
themselves exercise the right, it tends to be exercised for them by a private 
representative, or the rights get grouped and consolidated in class action proceedings. 
Sometimes the rights are sold to third party litigation-funders. Increasingly also, private 
enforcement operates through informal dispute resolution processes that bypass courts 
completely. Indeed, in this detail, the private enforcement of private rights has in recent 
years become yet more private still.   
Since the interests which private enforcement seeks to protect are usually private 
interests, the remedies it provides presumptively reflect the moral aim of protecting and 
restoring these interests as a matter of corrective justice.33 There are, however, some 
exceptions, like exemplary damages, which protect public interests. Such remedies are 
often considered controversial, on the basis that they embroil judges in implementing 
social policy goals that they are neither constitutionally authorised, nor practically 
qualified to pursue, or because they result in the punishment of wrongdoers without 
according them the normal, procedural protections. Of the two objections, the former is 
the stronger, although it may exaggerate judges’ legislative role and only applies where 
judges act without the statutory authorisation of Parliament. The latter objection is weak 
because modern views of exemplary damages suggest that they are not designed to 
punish in the stigmatic way that criminal sanctions do, but rather simply to deter, like a 
civil penalty.34 That being the case, the need for different evidence rules and additional 																																								 																					
Texas Law Rev 917, esp. 971–78; ‘Civil Recourse Revisited’ (2011) 39 Florida State University 
Law Review 341. 
33  See, seminally, E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (HUP, 1995); ‘Corrective Justice in a 
Nutshell’ (2002) 52 University of Toronto Law Journal 349.   
34  The language of punishment is still often used in both contexts, but is ambiguous. The ambiguity 
often stems from confusion over whether punishment is the aim (and if so what that aim is – eg, 
to exact retribution, or change behaviour) or an ‘effect’ (the imposition of a consequence that is 
more damaging to a defendant’s autonomy than the obligation to make good losses caused or give 
up gains made).        
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procedural protections for defendants is more debatable. In any event, where the conduct 
in question is grave and the prospective sanction equivalently severe, courts appear to 
require higher levels of evidence to satisfy the civil burden of proof.35  
The reasons for using private enforcement in private law are rarely examined, just 
assumed. The instrumental arguments, most common in the United States, are again that 
private parties are best positioned to provide information about the relevant wrongs and 
losses and that damages awards force wrongdoers to internalise the costs of their 
behaviour, contributing to efficient deterrence. But there are also powerful moral 
arguments from corrective justice and civil recourse theory that support private rights of 
action for all wrongful interferences with private interests. For a private party’s primary 
rights to be meaningful as domains of personal freedom, they must also be attended by 
powers to initiate and control outcomes in respects of interferences with those rights. 
Indeed, on this view, rights of action manifest the same, fundamental concern for the 
autonomy of persons as is expressed in the basic regime of private rights itself.36 To 
leave a person without a power to control and settle proceedings in relation to interests 
which private law says are his or hers alone would not just be pragmatically undesirable, 
but morally wrong. On this view, action rights are not simply efficient ways of enforcing 
laws and pursuing social goals, they are key components of the law’s respect for a private 
party’s basic entitlements before the law.          
 
D   Model 4 — Private Law, Public37 Enforcement 
 
There is, I think, considerable force in the argument last made. One of its 
consequences is that there are few instances in which private law is enforced publicly. 
Indeed, in most of the instances in which this occurs, it is because the relevant private 
party lacks the capacity to sue and no one else can properly represent and protect her 
private interests. State guardianship of vulnerable individuals parens patriae provides 
an example. Other examples include State Trustees stepping into the execution of private 
wills in order to prevent beneficiaries profiting from murderous designs,38 the Official 
Assignee in personal bankruptcy proceedings, and liquidators in company insolvencies, 
who have statutory powers to enforce and settle private law claims on behalf of the 
bankrupt or insolvent. In such cases, the bankrupt or insolvent is stripped of power to 
deal with its assets and the power is instead given to a publicly authorised agent in order 
to preserve and maximise the assets for creditors in a way that also ensures a fair, non-
preferential distribution.    
There are also some instances in the field of charitable trusts. Here, the Attorney-
General must be joined to all proceedings and the UK Charity Commission has powers 
to administer the trust’s assets cy-près, when its original purposes fail. 39  In both 
instances, the intervention of a public agent is explicable on the basis that, although the 
trust is technically a private institution, it exists partly for the promotion of public 
interests and receives tax exemptions accordingly. Not only is there no clearly definable 
private beneficiary class, but taxpayers need to be represented in the final administration.   
The motives for enforcing private law publicly are therefore also mixed. The 
phenomenon is very rare. It tends to be confined to cases of private incapacity; when 
private law institutions exist for partly public purposes requiring representation; where 																																								 																					
35  Law Commission (UK) Rep No 247 Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages 
[1.183]–[1.186]. 
36  See Section IVB. 
37  Enforcers referred to in this section include private parties or entities exercising public functions.   
38  See, e.g., Edwards v State Trustees Ltd [2016] VSCA 28. 
39  Charities Act 2011 (UK). 
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intervention in the administration of wills is necessary to prevent criminal profiteering; 
or where the assets of private parties are inadequate to meet their legal obligations and 
public intervention is needed to minimise social harm and ensure equitable, non-




IV   EXPLAINING ENFORCEMENT CHOICES? 
 
Reflecting on the above, are there any common arguments which explain and 
justify the enforcement choices across public and private law, or are these all simply the 
product of history, opportunity, or convenience? Some patterns clearly have historical 
explanations that are unlikely to be generalisable. But there do also appear to be a 
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A   Pragmatic Arguments 
 
A first, very pragmatic argument is that private enforcement should be used where 
public enforcement is impossible, and vice versa. So, if a private individual lacks the 
capacity to sue, then the state is justified in stepping in. If no state agency can act, then 
a private party should enforce. I call this the ‘default’ argument. Assuming that some 
form of enforcement is preferable to none (i.e. that using the default mode does not 
produce worse consequences overall than simply leaving the law unenforced), this type 
of argument is basically good. It should not, however, be mistaken for the idea that one 
is justified in using one type of enforcement not because the other is impossible, but 
because it happens not to be currently available. If both methods are possible, the better 
one should clearly be chosen, all things considered. If that method is currently 
unavailable, it should be created.    
A second argument featuring prominently in the competition literature is that the 
form of enforcement should be chosen that is most efficient in deterring wrongdoing, 
taking account of relative detection, information and litigation costs, the remedial 
possibilities offered by each system and the norms governing behavioural 
responsiveness to those incentives.40 Such arguments are respectable, but difficult to 
verify empirically and consequently tend to be inconclusive. The problem is evident in 
the ongoing squabble between US enforcement agencies and private litigation 
enthusiasts as to whether public or private enforcement has more ‘deterrence value’.41 
No one really knows for sure. Information and detection costs in cases involving 
secretive or widespread wrongdoing favour private enforcement, but the administrative 
costs of litigating privately are very high.    
A third argument is that one should simply align enforcement processes with 
interests. Public interests should thus be protected by public process and private interests 
by private process, because private parties are better motivated and able to represent 
their own interests than public agencies, and vice versa. This approach does approximate 
existing enforcement patterns. However, on a strict ‘alignment of process and interests’ 
logic, hybrid enforcement systems will still be acceptable in some instances in both 
public and private law because the alignment between public and private law and public 
and private interests is itself inexact. The tort of public nuisance, for example, protects 
both public health rights and private interests affected by health risks, so that it makes 
sense that both private and public enforcers can be involved. Violent assaults prejudice 
both public interests and private ones, so that they must logically be actionable by both 
the state and the victim. And so on.  
A fourth pragmatic argument is that the process selected should be the one that 
minimises the number of actions and associated court costs. This is another kind of 
efficiency argument, which focuses on just one type of relative, public cost. On this 
approach, claims implicating multiple parties should be channelled through a single, 
public enforcer, whereas claims in which only one person has an interest can be enforced 
privately. Like the preceding argument, it supports a general alignment between public 
enforcement and public law and private enforcement and private law, but it does not 
explain existing enforcement patterns exactly. ‘Mass torts’ injure multiple private 																																								 																					
40  See, e.g., R Lande and J Davis, ‘Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal 
Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws’ (2011) Brigham Young University Law Review. 315; G 
Werden, S Hammond and B Barnett, ‘Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools 
and Sanctions’ (2011) 56 Antitrust Bulletin 207; R Lande and J Davis, ‘The Extraordinary 
Deterrence of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Werden, Hammond, and Barnett’ (2013) 
58 Antitrust Bulletin 173; G Werden, ‘Cartel Deterrence through Criminal Enforcement; A 
Rejoinder to Lande and Davis’ (2013) 58 Antitrust Bulletin 191.  
41  Ibid. 
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interests simultaneously, but the law does not, for that reason, enforce the relevant 
private claims publicly. It simply provides mechanisms within the private law process 
for consolidating multiple claims through representative and class action procedures. 
Although multiplicity of actions is hence undoubtedly a common concern, it does not 
explain existing enforcement patterns convincingly and the argument would result in 
processes varying wildly across both public and private law, according to the number of 
persons who happened to have been affected by a wrong. This is not a sensible way to 
proceed.        
A final, pragmatic argument appears to concern the need to avoid conflicts of 
interest and institutional capture in the enforcement process. Enforcement should hence 
not be controlled by the very agency against which proceedings are directed — public 
agencies should hence never be charged with bringing proceedings against themselves. 
More broadly, however, enforcement should not be controlled by an agency that is 
captured — or which might publicly appear to be captured — by the interests of others 
against whom enforcement is sought. This argument may explain why private parties 
enforce many of the state’s duties in administrative law. It could also explain why the 
crime of misfeasance in public office has a private law analogue — the civil misfeasance 
tort offering a process for ensuring governmental accountability to citizens that is 
immune to state interference.42 It could also justify private criminal prosecutions in some 
cases of police wrongdoing. The argument seems less relevant in competition law since 
neither public enforcement agencies, nor private enforcers are obviously allied in their 
interests to those engaged in anti-competitive practice.  
 
B   A Moral Argument 
 
Because the above arguments are pragmatic, they are always sensitive to different 
contexts and circumstances. There is, however, a more general, moral argument from 
corrective justice and civil recourse theory, to which I have alluded above, according to 
which private enforcement powers are a key moral component of private claim rights 
and duties. On this view, wherever a wrong comprises not just the breach of a primary 
duty owed by the wrongdoer to the state, but also breach of a relational (interpersonal) 
primary duty owed to an individual, it is a vital dimension of respect for latter’s 
autonomy that he or she be empowered to control a process via which the wrongdoer is 
held accountable for the wrong and its personal consequences, whether or not the state 
also has its own independent powers of prosecution in the public interest. If the rights 
infringed belong to me, the argument runs, then the enforcement choices should be mine 
as well.43  
 This argument, I suggest, justifies and explains the almost universal private 
enforcement of private law and it characterises enforcement patterns as something other 
than purely pragmatic, institutional choices. It also justifies the existence of hybrid 
enforcement processes wherever an act is simultaneously both a wrong to the public and 
to a private individual. As we have seen, there are many instances in which this is the 																																								 																					
42  See, e.g., D Nolan, ‘A Public Law Tort: Understanding Misfeasance in Public Office’ in K Barker, 
S Degeling, K Fairweather, R Grantham (eds), Private Law and Power (Hart, 2017) 177, 199–200 
(suggesting that, consequently, the tort’s ‘standing’ rule be brought into line with that in 
administrative law proceedings and that the traditional ‘actual damage’ requirement be dropped).  
43  For the argument from civil recourse theory, see above n 32. Although its proponents suggest that 
civil recourse theory differs from corrective justice theory, the existence of rights of action for 
plaintiffs is important in both accounts: E Weinrib, ‘Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice’ (2011) 
39 Florida State University Law Review 273, 284–85. The distinction between corrective justice 
and civil recourse is also sometimes questioned: S Hershovitz, ‘Corrective Justice for Civil 
Recourse Theorists’ (2011) 39 Florida State University Law Review 107.  
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case; and anti-competitive acts represent a core example. The state therefore has a moral 
and a political obligation to its citizens to make both public and private enforcement 
processes available where public wrongs have both infringed private rights and damaged 
protected private interests.  
The power of this moral argument lies in its capacity for generalisation beyond 
particular historical contexts and in the fact that its validity is independent of squabbles 
over empirical data concerning effectiveness or efficiency. Because the content of public 
and private law is so varied and the contexts in which the various laws operate so 
different from one another, it therefore, has, I suggest, an especially powerful 
explanatory and justificatory force.   
The implication of the above analysis is that the basic enforcement patterns in 
public and private law, which we observed in Section III, are, for the most part, 
vindicated. There are strong arguments in favour of aligning enforcement processes and 
interests — public enforcement should generally be available to protect public interests 
and private enforcement to protect private ones. This is supported by the pragmatic 
efficiencies that such an alignment is likely to produce. But it is also justified by 
powerful moral and political arguments concerning the action rights to which persons 
are entitled by, respectively, their membership of a political community and their interest 
in common goods which that community shares, on the one hand, and their status as 
holders of private interests and rights, on the other.  
The basic symmetry of this alignment between enforcement processes and interests 
does not always, however, produce a clean alignment between public and private 
enforcement and public and private law, because both public and private law sometimes 
concern the protection of both public and private interests. In particular, where protected 
private interests are harmed or threatened by public wrongdoing, there are very good 
moral reasons for according the individuals concerned powers and choices in respect of 
the infringement of their private rights. There can also be powerful, pragmatic reasons 
for departing from the basic alignment of enforcement processes and interests in some 
instances, as, for example, where relevant private persons lack the legal capacity to 
represent their own interests and exercise their own rights of action, where the detection 
and enforcement of key public laws appears to be beyond the resources of the state, or 
where state enforcement of public law carries actual or perceived risks of self-preference 
or bias that threaten the rule of law. 		
V   CONCLUSIONS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 
 
Wherever public wrongs harm both public and protected private interests, a hybrid 
enforcement system in which both public agencies and private parties have rights of 
action is therefore entirely rational; indeed I have suggested that it is probably morally 
demanded.    
In such cases, at least two important challenges now remain. The first was Laura’s 
central concern, namely, to determine how best to co-ordinate public and private actions 
so as to minimise tensions between their underlying aims of deterrence and corrective 
justice; between evidential rules and standards applying to the separate proceedings; 
between limitation of action rules, and so on. There is no space to contribute significantly 
to this discussion here. I offer just one thought. As regards the perceived tension between 
deterrence and corrective justice in competition law, there is, I suggest, something 
morally very dubious in the idea that victims’ rights to corrective justice should be 
limited for the sake of encouraging wrongdoers to confess their wrongs, even if this is 
likely to contribute to broader regulatory and deterrence aims. To my knowledge, it has 
never been suggested that a child-abusing priest should be exempt from the obligation 
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to compensate his victims because this might encourage him to confess his crime and 
reveal other, secret abusers. Why, then, are matters any different in the case of secret 
cartel conspiracies and competition wrongs? Rewarding a wrongdoer for providing 
information is one thing, as is imposing a lighter criminal sanction in exchange for his 
co-operation. Granting him a liberty from any obligation to restore those he has harmed 
by his wrongdoing is quite another. The duties of corrective justice cannot be ‘traded 
off’ in the public interest — not, at least, unless society itself is prepared to fund 
compensation for victims as part of the social compromise via a statutory scheme. Justice 
for victims should certainly not be compromised by public agency deals in the absence 
of such provision. Whilst this thought does not conclude the debate, it does mean that 
anyone venturing to suggest that private enforcement actions in competition law need to 
be limited to encourage whistle-blowing must explain why the argument is morally 
acceptable here, when it is regarded as repugnant elsewhere in public law.    
The second challenge is to decide whether — and if so when — additional levels 
of hybridisation should be admitted into current enforcement systems, so as to permit 
either (or both) public and private proceedings to provide sanctions and remedies that 
(within one and the same proceeding) protect both public and private interests affected 
by the wrong. Currently this is exceptional — in competition law, for example, public 
aims and sanctions protecting the public interest are left to the public action; and private 
aims and remedies protecting private interests are left to the private action. This usually 
makes procedural and logistical sense. There are nonetheless some precedents for using 
a single proceeding to protect both sets of interests. The standout example is again the 
award of compensation orders for victims of crime at the suit of the public prosecutor, 
which avoids the need for secondary, civil actions. It could also be the case (although it 
currently is not) in judicial review proceedings, where compensation orders could easily 
be added to the list of remedies that a court can give where illegal decisions result in 
serious harm to private interests.44  It is a theoretical possibility — one that Laura 
supported — in public actions for competition wrongs too.  
The decision whether public and private interest protection should be combined in 
a single enforcement process will turn in part on pragmatic considerations concerning 
cost, process efficiencies and the availability within the confines of a given proceeding 
of access to the information and expertise necessary to make the relevant decision, 
including relevant calculations of the private harm that a public wrong has done. But it 
will also depend on whether or not it is possible to ensure proper representation for 
plaintiffs and procedural fairness for defendants. In so far as there are signs of 
willingness to protect both public and private interests in the same enforcement 
proceeding, these are currently more obvious in public enforcement proceedings than 
private ones. It is thought more convenient and constitutionally defensible to protect 
private interests through compensation or restitution orders in the public action, than to 
try to advance public interests through the imposition of penalties in the private one. Not 
only does the bi-partite information structure of private proceedings make the 
implementation of broader public policy ends difficult but, in most circumstances, 
judges in the private proceedings are constrained in the extent to which they can decide 
on the definition of the public good. The upshot is that, where hybrid wrongs are 
committed, we can probably expect separate public and private enforcement processes 
to continue as the norm and that most further movements toward the fully-integrated 
protection of public and private interests will be seen on the public, not the private 
enforcement side.   
 																																									 																					
44  See Cane, above n 30. 
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